Bush Institute Director: This Is Critical Year For Putin, Ukraine Needs Support
3- 4.03.2025, 14:51
- 9,556

Europe can play a decisive role.
The West overestimated Putin. Russia turned out to be much weaker in its military capabilities. 2025 could be a critical year for Russia if the democratic world continues to support Ukraine.
Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights in the George W. Bush Administration, and Former Director of Freedom House David Kramer told Charter97.org about this.
The interview was recorded before the quarrel between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump.
— Not long ago there was the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. How does it make you feel?
— It is the third anniversary of the full scale invasion of Ukraine, but it is not the beginning of Russia's aggression and attacks against Ukraine. We have to go back to November 2013 when Putin pressured the pro-Russian president at the time Yanukovych not to sign agreements with the EU. The reason that is so important is because NATO had nothing to do with the first invasion — it was about agreements Ukrainians were prepared to sign with the European Union. Then, following the Revolution of Dignity, Putin decided to intervene in Ukraine, illegally annex Crimea, and then move into the Donbas. There were more than 14,000 people killed on the Ukrainian side between February of 2014 until February of 2022.
Then, if you fast forward for the past three years, this has been entirely the responsibility of Putin and the Russian side: they bear the burden for what has happened to Ukraine. But it also is a story of tremendous Ukrainian resilience, courage, military capability and innovation. The initial designs of Putin to take over the country, to remove its leadership, to force neutrality on Ukraine and to recognize Russia's illegal annexation of four additional oblasts — that has been a total failure for Putin.
Now we are talking about roughly 18 to 20% of Ukraine's territory currently occupied by Russia. That, I think, is a tribute to Ukraine's ability to push back on a much larger military that has met its match with the Ukrainians.
— Indeed, initial Putin's designs did not materialize. How would you see Putin's intentions if a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine were to take place?
— I don't think Putin is seriously interested in a deal because his positions have not changed. Those positions are change in the Ukrainian government, recognition of occupied territory by Russia plus recognition of territory, Russia does not currently occupy (Russia doesn't control all four of these oblasts), permanent neutrality for Ukraine and no foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. Those positions are non-starters for the Ukrainian side.
As long as Putin remains firm in those views — there is no indication to think he has changed — I don't think he is serious about ending this war.
— Is it even possible to come to some sort of the agreement if one side is not willing to participate in negotiations in good faith?
— The only way it is possible, in my view, is to continue to provide critical military assistance to Ukraine, to help Ukraine change the landscape on the battlefield, to put Ukraine in the strongest position possible, to force Putin to recognize that he cannot win, that he needs to end this war. That's the positive way to end it.
The other way to end it is to force Ukraine into a deal that is not acceptable to the vast majority of the Ukrainian people or to the Ukrainian government. I hope that will not be the case. The best of those two options is to support Ukraine to put it in the strongest position possible rather than to force Ukraine into a deal that would be unacceptable.
— Assuming that some sort of a deal was reached, what do you see as a Putin intentions from that point on?
— I don't think Putin's intentions and designs on the region have changed. He does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign independent state. He made that clear as far back as 2008 and is meeting with my boss at the time President Bush. He has stuck to that position. His treatise in July of 2021 was further indication that he views Ukrainians as basically Russians. He doesn't recognize the sovereignty and independence of the countries along Russia's borders. Putin has essentially taken over Belarus. He pressures Moldova. He is getting his way in Georgia, unfortunately. So, Putin is interested in expansion and extending Russia's influence in the region and possibly even try to threaten countries that are members of the European Union and NATO.
If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine — I don't think he can, but if we allow him to — then he may also look at the three Baltic states in particular in a different way because he will view us as weak.
It's critically important that President Trump portrays an image of peace through strength.The way to do that is to continue to support Ukraine and the other countries in the region.
— Did Putin communicate to Bush Administration in any shape or form that Ukrainians, in his view, are basically Russians?
— He said that he didn't think Ukraine was a real independent state. He didn't go as far in 2008 as he did when he wrote that article in 2021, but he did not view Ukraine as a real independent state.
— What do you make of the current Administration nascent policy towards Russia? What are they trying to achieve? [The conversation with David Kramer took place before the argument between Trump and Zelensky — editorial note.]
— I think it is interesting that in the first week or two, president Trump offered some criticism of Putin for launching the invasion, talked tough about imposing new sanctions and talked about extending military assistance to Ukraine. Then, the phone call occurred between President Trump and Putin — that seemed to have changed things, it launched the process where Secretary Rubio and National Security Advisor Waltz and special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Lavrov and Ushakov in Riyadh. Then, it was followed up with another meeting between US and Russian officials talking about embassies and diplomatic presence in both countries. So, we seem to have moved from the early part of the Trump administration (it is one month old, barely). We have seen a change where there seems to be interest in improving relations.
To me, it is hard to understand how we could normalize relations with Russia as long as Putin is in power and as long as Russia continues to attack Ukraine. Every night Russia launches massive drone and aerial attacks against Ukraine, killing innocent Ukrainian civilians. Every night Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory. Every night Ukrainians are under threat from a Russian attack.
Unless and until Russia ends its unprovoked, unjustified war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against Ukraine, it is hard for me to understand how we could be talking about any normalization of relations with Russia.
— Do you think Russia can maintain this war in its current pace?
— I don't think so. I think there has been from the beginning an overestimation of Russia's military capabilities and an underestimation of Ukraine's military capabilities. It is a wrong view that Russia can do this as long as it takes. Putin, I think, certainly believes that he can outlast the West. I think he has a view that the West will not continue to support Ukraine.
We need to recognize that Putin has suffered enormous losses in this war. The number now is over 800,000 casualties on the Russian side, tremendous loss to Russia's military capabilities, destruction of Russian tanks and missile systems and others. The Ukrainians are now able to launch serious strikes deep inside Russian territory. So, I don't think Putin can do this forever. This is a critical year.
The economy in Russia is suffering as well. Inflation is up. Interest rates are up. Yet part of the problem is that Putin relies on the poor regions of Russia to supply the troops to send into battle. And he provides money. So, for many poor families in Russia, sending fathers, sons, brothers off to fight is an income generator. Putin understands that. That's why he feels he can continue to rely on these regions in Russia that are not Moscow or St. Petersburg in order to provide the personnel he needs. But I don't think that can last forever. It's also going to lead to huge economic strain. The Russian economy has become heavily militarized and that is not sustainable over not just the long term, but in the near term and medium term.
— On the other hand, one might say that the sanctions imposed by previous administration didn't have that devastating effect as they were hoping for.
— The sanctions were the toughest we have seen against any government in any country following the full-scale invasion in 2022. Sanctions don't have an immediate impact — that's certainly been true in the case of Belarus, and also in Russia. But I think they are having an impact. I think there's also been a need to tighten the sanctions and force them more aggressively and extend secondary sanctions, so that countries and companies and individuals that are helping Russia evade the sanctions will face stiff penalties as well.
Sanctions aren't the only solution. Sanctions have to be part of a larger policy. And the larger policy includes vital military assistance to Ukraine, financial support to Ukraine. But we also need to add to the sanctions not just the freezing of the $300 billion in Russian assets, but the seizing of that money. Those $300 billion should never be returned to Russia given the damage and destruction it has caused in Ukraine. And that money should be used for Ukraine, either for reconstruction or for pushing back militarily.
— Is it technically possible to take this money out and provide it to Ukraine?
— Absolutely. It is both technically possible and legally possible. Congress has passed what's called the REPO Act, which enables then the Biden administration and now the Trump administration to seize the several billion dollars that are in the United States.
Of this $300 billion not much is in the United States, most of it is in Europe, but it is possible. It's a political decision. It's not a technical decision. It's not a legal decision.
One of the concerns raised is, if we did this, then China might pull its money out of Western financial institutions. My response to that is China doesn't have to worry, as long as it doesn't invade Taiwan. But if China invades Taiwan, then we should seize Chinese money as well. Otherwise the Russians and the Chinese by putting their funds in Western financial institutions are essentially buying a pass for their aggression against their neighbors. That shouldn't be allowed.
— Is it correct to say that the biggest leverage, speaking of $300 billion, is in European's hands, not in the US?
— Absolutely. 150 billion or so is in Euroclear alone (financial institution with headquarters in Belgium). I think, it is about 220 to 230 billion that is in European financial institutions. So the Europeans have an absolutely critical role to play on this.
— What role could the Europeans play in guaranteeing the lasting peace in Ukraine?
— The Europeans could play an absolutely critical role. It's the Europeans who would provide, what I prefer to call a deterrent force rather than a peacekeeping force to make sure we deter Russia from doing this again. Prime Minister Starmer talked about contributing, I think, about 20 or 30 thousand UK troops for a European force. France has also talked about it. So, the Europeans have an absolutely critical role. This is why it is so important for not just the Ukrainians to have a seat at the table for any negotiations that take place, but for the rest of Europe as well. I deliberately say the rest of Europe, because Ukraine is part of Europe. The rest of Europe should have a seat because Europe will play a critical role in this.
— As we just discussed, Putin is not willing to stop, but on the other hand he does not seem to have the capacity to continue indefinitely. Does he have some viable exit strategy?
— I think his exit strategy is that he can outlast the West. Then, he thinks he can win. We have to assume that Putin does not get very reliable information on what is really happening. There aren't many people in his circle who are prepared to deliver bad news to him. In his mind he may think he is winning. He may not have a full picture of the losses Russia has incurred.
— Eventually, if some sort of peace solution were found, on which side of the divide would you see Belarus?
— Lukashenka bears responsibility for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine because he allowed the territory of Belarus to be used by Russian forces to launchpad of the invasion. Lukashenka, I think, has been an accomplice to Putin's war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Then, there are the issues inside Belarus: the stealing of the election in August of 2020, the vicious and brutal crackdown inside the country. Even though he released recently three political prisoners after the visit by a US official to Belarus, there are over 1200 political prisoners — Lukashenka bears responsibility for this as well.
I hope that if Ukraine is able to prevail in this conflict, that that will create all sorts of trouble for Lukashenka. I think if Russia is forced into retreat, they will be in a weaker position to support Lukashenka. There's a lot riding on what happens in Ukraine because it doesn't just affect Ukraine, it affects the entire continent. That would include what happens inside Belarus as well.